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Abstract
We seek to find normative criteria of ad-
equacy for nonmonotonic logic similar to
the criterion of validity for deductive logic.
Rather than stipulating that the conclusion
of an inference be true in all models in which
the premises are true, we require that the
conclusion of a nonmonotonic inference be
true in “almost all” models of a certain sort
in which the premises are true. This “cer-
tain sort” specification picks out the models
that are relevant to the inference, taking into
account factors such as specificity and vague-
ness, and previous inferences. The frequen-
cies characterizing the relevant models reflect
known frequencies in our actual world. The
criteria of adequacy for a default inference
can be extended by thresholding to criteria of
adequacy for an extension. We show that this
avoids the implausibilities that might other-
wise result from the chaining of default in-
ferences. The model proportions, when con-
strued in terms of frequencies, provide a veri-
fiable grounding of default rules, and can be-
come the basis for generating default rules
from statistics.
Keywords: probability, frequency, default
logic
1 Introduction
Non-monotonic reasoning, for example default
logic [Reiter, 1980], models the intuitive process
of making non-deductive inferences in the face of
certain supportive but not conclusive evidence. Given
a default theory ∆ = 〈D,F 〉, we can obtain its
extensions by following a prescribed set of steps.
However, on what grounds do we employ a particular
default rule? Some writers would regard this as
an inappropriate question, since they take as their
goal the representation of human inference. To
this end defaults represent rules that we take to be
intuitively appropriate. But then when we apply
these rules, we may be led to counterintuitive re-
sults [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981,  Lukaszewicz, 1988,
Poole, 1989]. The underlying principle seems to be
circular: the original default rules are “intuitively
good” at first glance, but when we discover that
they do not give rise to the desired results, we tweak
the rules until they give us those results. It seems
that we have to know what results we want first
before constructing the default theory, rather than
having the default theory tell us what conclusions are
warranted. This is precisely the reason why we need
an independent measure of validity for default rules
and default extensions. We think of nonmonotonic
logic as sharing the normative character of other
logics. From this point of view default rules require
some defense. We will concentrate on default logic
here, though much of what we have to say will apply
to other nonmonotonic approaches as well. Much of
the work on nonmonotonic logic has concerned the
syntactic manipulation of the nonmonotonic rules,
rather than their basic justification.
1.1 Selective Preference
For a default rule d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
, α is the prerequisite,
β1, . . . , βn are the justifications , and γ is the conse-
quent of d. Loosely speaking, the rule conveys the
idea that if α is provable, and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βn are each
not provable, then by default we conclude that γ is
true. A default theory is an ordered pair 〈D,F 〉, where
D is a set of default rules and F is a set of “facts”. A
theory extended from F by applying the default rules
in D is known as an extension of the default theory.
Consider the following canonical example.
Example 1 We have a default theory ∆ = 〈D,F 〉,
where
D = {R(x):T (x)
T (x) ,
S(x):¬T (x)
¬T (x) },
F = {R(a), S(a)}.
We get two extensions, one containing T (a) and the
other containing ¬T (a). If we take “R(x)” to mean
that x is a bird, “S(x)” to mean that x is a penguin,
and “T (x)” to mean that x flies, then we would like
to reject the extension containing “T (a)” (a flies) in
favor of the extension containing “¬T (a)” (a does not
fly). However, if we take “S(x)” to mean that x is
an animal instead and keep “R(x)” and “T (x)” the
same, we would want to reverse our preference. Now
the extension containing “T (a)” (a flies) seems better.
✷
Note that each of the default rules involved in the
example above is intuitively appealing when viewed
by itself against our background knowledge: birds fly;
penguins do not fly; and animals in general do not fly
either. Moreover, both instantiations (penguins and
animals) are syntactically identical. Thus, we cannot
base our decision to prefer one default rule over the
other by simply looking at their syntactic structures.
It is the interaction between the default rules and evi-
dence that gives rise to the selective preference above.
We have the evidence that “a is a bird”. If in addition
we also have “a is a penguin”, we prefer the penguin
rule. If instead we have “a is an animal”, we prefer
the bird rule.
There are several approaches to circumventing
this conceptual difficulty. The first is to revise
the default theory so that the desired result is
achieved [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981]. We can amend
the default rules by adding the exceptions as justifica-
tions, for example B(x):F (x),¬P (x)
F (x) and
A(x):¬F (x),¬B(x)
¬F (x) .
With this approach we have to constantly revise the
default rules to take into account additional excep-
tions. We have little guidance in constructing the list
of justifications except that the resulting default rule
has to produce the “right” answer in the given situa-
tion.
Another approach is to establish some priority struc-
ture over the set of defaults. For example, we can
refer to a specificity or inheritance hierarchy to de-
termine which default rule should be used in case of
a conflict [Touretzky, 1984, Horty et al., 1987]. The
penguin rule is more specific than the bird rule, when
both are applicable, and therefore we use the pen-
guin rule and not the bird rule. However, conflict-
ing rules do not always fit into neat hierarchies (for
example, adults are employed, students are not, how
about adult students? [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981]).
It is not obvious how we can extend the hierar-
chical structure without resorting to explicitly enu-
merating the priority relations between the default
rules [Brewka, 1989, Brewka, 1994].
The third approach is to appeal to probabilistic analy-
sis. Defaults are interpreted as representing properties
of conditional probabilities. For example, the condi-
tional probability of a being able to fly given that a is
a bird is “high” [Pearl, 1988, Pearl, 1990] or increases
from the prior probability [Neufeld et al., 1990], while
the conditional probability of a being able to fly given
that a is a penguin is “low” or decreases. This ap-
proach provides a probabilistic semantics for default
rules, but in a way which does not represent the fact
that the conclusions are accepted . The default con-
clusion is “Tweety flies,” not “Probably Tweety flies.”
This is in contrast to the spirit of nonmonotonic rea-
soning: default conclusions should be accepted as new
facts, and we should be able to chain default rules and
build upon the conclusions of previous default appli-
cations to obtain further conclusions.
1.2 Justifying Nonmonotonic Inference
The justification of beliefs is a long standing is-
sue in epistemology. There is not much that is
problematic about the justification of beliefs ob-
tained by deductive inference (though there are
plenty of problems that surround deduction — see
[Kyburg, 1958, Haack, 1976, Dummett, 1978], not to
mention the voluminous literature on paraconsistent
logic [Priest, 1989]). The reason is that we can show
that the ordinary rules of deduction lead from premises
to conclusions that are true in every model in which
the premises are true. This is exactly what is not true
of ampliative inference, and it is what has led some
writers (e.g., [Morgan, 1998]) to deny that there is any
such thing as a nonmonotonic logic. This has been dis-
puted in [Kyburg, 2001].
But other kinds of justifications of beliefs have
been proposed. Isaac Levi [Levi, 1967, Levi, 1980,
Levi, 1996] has argued for many years that the way
to understand ampliative (inductive, nonmonotonic)
argument is in terms of decision theory: we choose
(decide) to accept a hypothesis in a given context pro-
vided that the expected epistemic utility of doing so in
that context is greater than the expected utility of any
other epistemic act, such as suspending belief totally,
or accepting a stronger hypothesis.
Levi’s approach employs a rich and detailed struc-
ture for acceptance, and allows drawing many impor-
tant distinctions. This structure requires three things
that make it less than perfect as a vehicle for ordi-
nary nonmonotonic inferential systems. First, in keep-
ing with a long tradition in pragmatism [Dewey, 1938,
Peirce, 1903, James, 1948] the context of inquiry must
be tied to a specific problem: We need the answer to
a question. Second, the epistemic expectation of an
answer is the expected value of the information con-
tained in that answer. Thus we need to presuppose an
information measure on the language of our inquiry
[Levi, 1996, p. 169]. Third, we need to have available
a credal or inductive probability, based on a measure
(or convex set of measures) on the sentences of the lan-
guage, in terms of which a conditional probability (or
convex set of conditional probabilities) can be defined
[Levi, 1980, p. 52].
It is our belief both that in some contexts in which
we might wish to use nonmonotonic mechanisms, this
overhead is unnecessary, and perhaps itself difficult to
justify, and that we would like to be able to explicate
the justification of inference in a less context depen-
dent way.
Another approach that has attracted considerable
attention in the philosophical community in recent
years is that of “reliabilism” whose best known ex-
ponent is Alvin Goldman [Goldman, 1979]. Accord-
ing to this view, what justifies a belief is the fact
that it is obtained by a “reliable cognitive process...”
[Goldman, 1979, p. 20] Of course there are a num-
ber of additional hedges to the view that are required
for philosophical accuracy, and even with those hedges
there remains a certain vagueness in the view. These
details need not detain us, since we are seeking inspi-
ration rather than philosophical precision.
What does “reliable” mean? We will construe reliabil-
ity in terms of frequency or propensity to yield truth
when applied. Specifically, we will say that the be-
lief φ is nonmonotonically justified by a default rule if
the rule would frequently lead to truth and rarely to
error, given what we know — given our background
knowledge.
A deductive argument is justified (valid) if its conclu-
sion is true in every model of its premises. We will
attempt to provide an analog of the justification of
deductive rules: a default argument is justified if its
conclusion is true in a high proportion of the relevant
models in which its premises are true. To make this
idea precise requires an excursion into model theory.
2 Model Theory
We will suppose that the underlying object language is
a first order language that does not involve such inten-
sional predicates as “know” or “believe.” A number of
nonmonotonic formalisms (specifically autoepistemic
logic [Moore, 1985]) do involve such locutions within
the object language, but they can be dispensed with
in default logic. The default rule α:β1,...,βn
γ
can be read
in terms of the nonmembership of p¬βiq in a specified
set of expressions Γ. In original default logic, Γ would
just be an extension.
There are a number of immediate problems associated
with the idea of looking at the “proportion” of mod-
els. The least of them is choosing a level at which to
regard the evidence as adequate. Should we require
that the proportion be 0.95? Or 0.99? Or 0.995? This
is just the sort of question that arises in statistical hy-
pothesis testing or in confidence interval estimation.
We shall suppose that in a given context there is some
agreed-upon level of security δ; we will accept a con-
clusion if the proportion of models in which we could
be committing an error is no greater than δ.
This approach is to be contrasted with those of Adams
[Adams, 1975, Adams, 1966], Pearl [Pearl, 1988] and
Bacchus et al [Bacchus et al., 1993]. Adams requires
that for A to be a reasonable consequence of the set
of sentences S, for any ǫ there must be a positive δ
such that for every probability function, if the proba-
bility of every sentence in S is greater than 1− δ, then
the probability of A is at least 1 − ǫ [Adams, 1966,
p. 274]. Pearl’s approach similarly involves quantifi-
cation over possible probability functions. Bacchus et
al again take the degree of belief of a statement to be
the limiting proportion of first order models in which
the statement is true. All of these approaches involve
matters that go well beyond what we may reasonably
suppose to be available to us as empirical enquirers.
Our δ, on the other hand, serves much like the α of
statistical testing.
We must restrict the number of models under consid-
eration to a finite number so that the idea of looking at
proportions makes sense.1 We will be taking account
of statistical information, and to this end will want
each model to have a finite domain. Roughly speaking,
we take as a model of our language one in which the
domain of empirical individuals is of finite cardinality.
This may be regarded as problematic (it entails the
1We could, instead, seek to develop a way of proceeding
to a limit; this still would require restrictions to arrive at
a countable number of models, and would entail a large
expository cost for little gain in plausibility.
falsity of “every person has two parents and nobody
is his own ancestor”) but with reasonable spatial and
temporal bounding it can be rendered plausible.
Even so, to ensure that the set of models is finite we
must restrict the empirical domain even further. Not
only must it consist of a finite set of physical entities,
but this same set of physical entities D must be taken
to be the empirical domain of every model.
We assume that it is possible to express statisti-
cal knowledge in this language. For example, if
“B(x)” is the predicate “is a bird” and “F (x)”
is “can fly”, we can express the fact that be-
tween 85% and 95% of birds fly by the formula
0.85 < |{x:B(x)∧F (x)}||{x:B(x)}| < 0.95. Employing the no-
tation of [Kyburg and Teng, 2001] we write this as
“%x(F (x), B(x), 0.85, 0.95).” This renders “%” a vari-
able binding operator on 4-sequences of expressions:
two formulas and two fractions.
We distinguish, as do Pearl and Geffner
[Pearl and Geffner, 1990, p. 70] between imme-
diate evidence, represented by a finite set of sentences
E concerning particular facts (to be distinguished
from the general body of factual knowledge F invoked
by classical default logic), and a finitely axiomatizable
set of sentences K representing general background
knowledge. What defaults are plausible depends,
of course, on background knowledge. If it were not
for what we take to be the typical (or natural, or
frequent) behavior of birds, the world’s best known
example of a default rule would not be plausible. On
the other hand no one has proposed the default rule
fish(a):mackerel(a)
can−talk(a) .
Thus in general we will represent the set of default
rules of a default theory as ∆K rather than D, since
we take them to be a function of our body of general
knowledge K. Given an error tolerance δ, we will take
a default rule to be δ-valid if, for every set of possible
input sentencesE consistent withK, the application of
the rule to E leads to a false conclusion in a proportion
of at most δ of the relevant models. More precisely, a
default rule is δ-valid if and only if for every set of
input sentences E consistent with K to which the rule
is applicable, the proportion of models of E ∪ K in
which the conclusion of the rule is false is no more
than δ.
To fix our ideas, let us begin with a simple example.
Suppose K includes a statement to the effect that at
least 1−δ and not more than 1 - ǫ of birds fly and noth-
ing else; that is, “%x(F (x), B(x), 1 − δ, 1 − ǫ).” Con-
sider the rule B(x):F (x)
F (x) . This rule is “applicable” to
immediate evidence E only if E ∪K entails a sentence
of the form pB(a)q and no corresponding sentence of
the form p¬F (a)q.
Our models have a single domain D of finite cardinal-
ity. We will write “Im(φ)” for the interpretation of φ
in the model m. The constraint imposed by K is that
for every model m the proportion of objects in Im(B)
that are also in Im(F ) lies in [1− δ, 1− ǫ].
There are three cases. First, suppose E ∪K does not
entail a sentence of the form pB(a)q. Then the rule
is inapplicable. Second, suppose that for some term
a, E ∪ K entails “B(a)” and also entails “¬F (a)”.
The rule is again inapplicable, because it is blocked
by the failure of a justification. Third, suppose for
some term a, E ∪K entails “B(a)” but not “¬F (a)”.
Then Im(a) ∈ Im(B). There are |Im(B)| interpreta-
tions of a that make E ∪K true; of these at least 1− δ
make “F (a)” true. We have said nothing about in-
terpreting the rest of the language, but however many
interpretations there are (we have seen to it that there
are only a finite number) the proportion that renders
“F (a)” true will remain unchanged; it will be at least
1− δ. Thus, given the background knowledge that we
have posited, the rule is δ-valid: if it is applicable it
will lead to error no more than 1− δ of the time.
Now let us consider a somewhat more complex exam-
ple: Suppose we know that typically birds fly, and that
typically penguins don’t. If that is in our background
knowledge K, as well as “∀x(P (x) ⊃ B(x))”, then
the flying default becomes B(x):F (x),¬P (x)
F (x) , and we also
have the default P (x):¬F (x)¬F (x) . If E entails “P (a)”, only
the second default is applicable. In no more than δ of
the models of E will a fly, unless E ∪K entails that a
can fly.
Another example: Suppose K contains vague informa-
tion about the frequency with which red birds fly (per-
haps because we have encountered few red birds). Say
that we know the frequency to be between 0.50 and 1.0.
Since the interval for birds in general [1−δ, 1− ǫ] is in-
cluded in [0.5, 1.0], this additional piece of information
should not interfere with our inference of flying abil-
ity. There is no conflict between the two intervals, just
less precision in one. The rule about birds in general
can be applied to red birds. However, if K contains
the knowledge that between 0.5 and r of red birds fly,
where r is less than 1− ǫ, then this information should
interfere. In this case the general rule should be so
construed that it does not apply to red birds. If b is a
red bird and not a penguin, no conclusion about flying
ability is justified.
We can arrange this by judiciously adding or deleting
justifications in the general bird rule, in accordance
with the statistical information in K: in the first case
we allow red birds; in the second we must require that
we do not know a is red: “¬R(x)” must be among
the justifications of the rule. This statistical approach
provides exactly the normative guidance that is lacking
in the ad-hoc approach of tweaking default rules in
order to arrive at the “intuitive” results.
More generally, we can give recipes for constructing
δ-valid defaults for conclusions of the form pφ(a)q
from background knowledge K and immediate evi-
dence E.2 Let K contain p%x(φ(x), ψ(x), p, q)q and
p%x(φ(x), ψ′(x), p′, q′)q. We consider three cases:
1. K entails p∀x(ψ(x) ⊃ ψ′(x))q. There are three
subcases according to the relation among p, p′, q,
q′:
(a) (p ≤ p′ and q ≤ q′) or (p′ ≤ p and q′ ≤ q)
ψ(x):φ(x)
φ(x) and
ψ′(x):¬ψ(x),φ(x)
φ(x) are candidate
defaults.
(b) p ≤ p′ and q′ ≤ q
ψ′(x):φ(x)
φ(x) is the only candidate default, since
the justification ¬ψ′(x) of ψ(x):φ(x),¬ψ
′(x)
φ(x) is
inconsistent with the prerequisite ψ(x) and
K.
(c) p′ ≤ p and q ≤ q′
ψ(x):φ(x)
φ(x) and
ψ′(x):¬ψ(x),φ(x)
φ(x) are candidate
defaults.
2. K entails p∀x(ψ′(x) ⊃ ψ(x))q. This is symmetri-
cal to case 1.
3. K entails neither p∀x(ψ(x) ⊃ ψ′(x))q nor
p∀x(ψ′(x) ⊃ ψ(x))q. Again there are three sub-
cases:
(a) (p ≤ p′ and q ≤ q′) or (p′ ≤ p and q′ ≤ q)
The candidate defaults are ψ(x):φ(x),¬ψ
′(x)
φ(x)
and ψ
′(x):¬ψ(x),φ(x)
φ(x) .
(b) p ≤ p′ and q′ ≤ q
ψ(x):φ(x),¬ψ′(x)
φ(x) and
ψ′(x):φ(x)
φ(x) are candidate
default rules.
(c) p′ ≤ p and q ≤ q′: This is symmetrical to
case 3(b).
2 Of course any default conclusion can be given this
form, particularly if we allow the term a to be an n-
sequence of terms. Furthermore, any such conclusion can
be taken to be an instance of the consequent of a statis-
tical generalization, in virtue of the fact that statistical
generalizations merely impose bounds. We are not impos-
ing serious limitations on default rules. For details, see
[Kyburg and Teng, 2001].
Having generated a list of candidate default rules
based on our background knowledgeK, we delete those
rules derived from statistics with a lower measure less
than 1− δ. The remainder is the set of defaults ∆K .
We have not taken account of relations among default
conclusions that may be entailed by K. If K con-
tains p∀x(φ(x) ≡ φ′(x))q then the default conclusion
pφ(a)q behaves just like the default conclusion pφ′(a)q.
If K contains p∀x(φ(x) ⊃ φ′(x))q, then since pφ(x)q
is equivalent to pφ(x) ∧ φ′(x)q and pφ′(x)q is equiva-
lent to pφ(x) ∨ φ′(x)q we can make use of the obvious
entailment relations.
Soundness of a system of deductive logic requires that
the conclusion of any inference be true in every model
in which the premises are true. Clearly nonmonotonic
inference should not be sound. But there is a property
that is like soundness that applies to default inference.
It is the property that the conclusion is false in at most
a fraction δ of the models of the premises K ∪ E.
Theorem 1 (Default Soundness) For every set of
observations E, if d ∈ ∆K is applicable to E, the pro-
portion of models of E ∪K in which the conclusion of
d is false is less than δ.
The proof of this theorem is provided by the
soundness theorem for evidential probability
[Kyburg and Teng, 2001, p. 241], since the rules
for deriving defaults are a subset of the rules for
computing evidential probabilities. ✷
3 Interactions within an Extension
Having determined which default rules are justified
with respect to the background knowledge, the next
step is to investigate the interaction between default
rules in generating an extension. A default extension
is a minimal deductively closed set that contains the
given facts and the consequents of all applicable de-
fault rules. Given an evidence set, we need to deter-
mine how to control the compound effects of multiple
defaults in an extension.
Take for example, a default version [Poole, 1989] of the
probabilistic lottery paradox [Kyburg, 1961]. There
are n species of birds, S1, . . . , Sn. We can say that
penguins are atypical in that they cannot fly; hum-
mingbirds are atypical in that they have very fine mo-
tor control; parrots are atypical in that they could talk;
and so on. If we apply this train of thought to all n
species of birds, there is no typical bird left, as for each
species there is always at least one aspect in which it
is atypical. A parallel scenario is formulated below.
Example 2 K contains
B(x) ≡ S1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ Sn(x)
[an exhaustive list of bird species]
Si(x) ⊃ ¬Sj(x), for all j 6= i
[species are mutually exclusive]
%(Si(x), B(x), ǫi, δi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
[the proportion of each Si species of birds
is “small”]
From K we can derive n δ∗-valid default rules for ∆K :
di =
B(x) : ¬Si(x)
¬Si(x)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where δ∗ is the maximum of δ1, . . . , δn.
Now consider the evidence set E = {B(a)}. In the
original formulation of default logic, we would get n ex-
tensions, each one containing one Si(a) and the nega-
tions of all the other Sj(a)’s. Thus, for each extension,
we would conclude that a is a particular species of bird,
which seems to be an over commitment, considering we
have %(Si(x), B(x), ǫi, δi) in K. ✷
Note that each of the n default rules is δ-valid when
considered individually, but in an extension the rules
interact to sanction a set of conclusions that when
taken together seems implausible according to our
knowledge of model frequencies. The definition of an
extension dictates that we must keep applying rules
until all “applicable” ones are exhausted. The “ap-
plicability” condition is based on maximizing logical
strength: for d = α:β1,...,βm
γ
, as long as α is derivable,
and the β’s are consistent with the extension, we must
apply d and add γ to the extension. Thus, for each
of the extensions above, we have to keep applying the
rules until we have drawn n − 1 conclusions: ¬Sj(a)
for all j 6= i. Then the consistency requirement blocks
the last default rule di, as B(x) ⊃ S1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ Sn(x)
together with ¬Sj(a) for all j 6= i gives us Si(a), con-
tradicting the β of di. From %(Si(x), B(x), ǫi, δi), we
know the proportion of models in which Si(a) is true,
and thus the proportion of models satisfying this ex-
tension, given E, is at most δi, a small ratio.
3.1 Sequential Thresholding
The validity criteria for individual default rules can be
extended to extensions resulted from the application
of a chain of default rules. We can think of the task
of regulating the compound effect of multiple default
rules as adjusting the set of relevant models by taking
into account the default conclusions of all previously
applied rules in the chain of reasoning.
One way to accomplish this is by sequential thresh-
olding [Teng, 1997]. The applicability condition of a
default rule α:β1,...,βm
γ
in an extension can be modified
to take into account the validity of the rule. In addi-
tion to requiring that α is provable and that none of
¬β1, . . . ,¬βn are provable, we require that the default
rule be “above threshold”, that is, the proportion of
relevant models satisfying the consequent γ be greater
than a threshold 1− ǫ∗.
The set of relevant models shrinks in a stepwise fash-
ion. We start out with all the models satisfying the
background knowledge and evidence we have. As de-
fault rules are applied sequentially, the consequent of
the applied rule at each step is taken as true in all
subsequent steps. The relevant models at a particu-
lar step are then those that are consistent with the
given facts and all the consequents of the rules applied
in the previous steps. A default rule, even if it is δ-
valid with respect to the background knowledge, would
be blocked from application if it does not satisfy the
thresholding criterion.
In [Teng, 1997], the thresholding metric is based on a
simple probability measure of possible worlds. We can
easily extend this metric to employ the same measure
as that used for evaluating the δ-validity of default
rules.
Example 3 Reconsider Example 2. Let us take ǫ∗ ≥
δ∗. We start out with the set M of all models satis-
fying K and E. From %(S1(x), B(x), ǫ1, δ1) we know
that d1 is above threshold, and it satisfies the other
conditions for applicability. Therefore we apply d1 and
conclude ¬S1(a).
Now consider d2. The set M
′ of relevant models at
this point is a subset of M; it contains only those
models in M that satisfy our new conclusion ¬S1(a)
as well. We have eliminated the models in which S1(a)
is true. Since S1(x) ⊃ ¬S2(x), and S1(x) ⊃ B(x), all
the models eliminated satisfy B(a), and none satisfies
S2(a). Thus, in M
′, the number of models satisfy-
ing S2(a) is the same as in M. However, the number
of models satisfying B(a) is lower in M′ as a result
of the addition of ¬S1(a). This gives rise to a higher
proportion of models satisfying S2(a) in M
′ (δ′2) than
in M (δ2). If δ
′
2 ≤ ǫ
∗, d2 is still above threshold after
the application of d1, and we can apply it to obtain
¬S2(a). Otherwise, d2 is below threshold, and we can-
not apply it even though it was above threshold before
the application of d1.
After each step of applying a rule, the set of relevant
models shrinks, and the proportion of Si(a) of any
unapplied rule di increases. After a number of steps,
all the remaining rules would be below threshold, and
we thus obtain an extension containing only a portion
of the conclusions that would otherwise be present in
the non-thresholding version of the extension. ✷
Note that the size of ǫ∗ determines how much risk is
tolerated in an extension. The higher the ǫ∗, the more
of the rules can be applied and the longer they can
stay above threshold. Reiter’s non-thresholding ver-
sion corresponds to the case when ǫ∗ = 1; that is,
every rule whose associated proportion is above 0 is
allowed, and logical consistency alone determines the
rule’s admissibility.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a notion of validity for default in-
ference based on model proportions. A rule is δ-valid
if the proportion of models in which the consequent of
the rule is satisfied is greater than 1 − δ in the rele-
vant models picked out by the background knowledge,
the evidence, and the applicability conditions of the
default rule. Given a body of background knowledge
K, we can systematically generate candidate default
rules and determine which ones are δ-valid based on
the statistical facts known in K. Conflicts between de-
fault rules stemming from multiple inheritance are re-
solved as a consequence of the validation process. The
result is a set of δ-valid default rules which are “pre-
compiled” for a given background knowledge base,
and can be reused for different evidence sets without
change.
This idea of evaluating the validity of a default rule
using model proportions is extended to extensions gen-
erated by a combinations of rules. The compound ef-
fect is regulated by a sequential thresholding process,
which blocks the rules whose associated model propor-
tions with respect to the “current” (shrinking) set of
models fall below a particular comfort threshold. This
allows us to use a more reasonable “closure condition”
for extension than the usual maximal logical strength:
we can refrain from applying rules that would make
the extension satisfiable in only a small set of models,
even if the consequent of the rule is logically consistent
with the extension.
Grounding the justification of default rules in model
proportions provides a way to validate the rules em-
pirically, and is a first step towards automating the
learning of default rules from (statistical) data. One
might ask why we need the default rules when we can
reason with the statistics directly. Default rules pro-
vide a succinct and more understandable characteri-
zation of the import of the data, as well as a smooth
articulation of the information that may exist in the
knowledge base.
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